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Abstract
The article is devoted to a further study of the Compton camera method of passive detection of small
amounts of special nuclear materials, developed by the authors in their previous work. Various cargo
scenarios, detector errors, and other issues are addressed.
1 Introduction
In [2], some of the authors of this work developed and conducted first numerical testing of algorithms
that allow the detection of small, very low emission sources embedded in a much larger background (see
also [43] for an alternative Bayesian technique). The algorithms developed required using some directional
information for particles hitting the detectors. Since collimation is not a viable option at the extremely low
SNR levels (on the order of .1%) considered, it was suggested to use the so called Compton type cameras,
which are currently available for γ particles detection and are being developed for neutrons [19, 36].
The techniques of [2], developed and tested under some rather restrictive assumptions, require further de-
tailed numerical scrutiny under more complex cargo scenarios than the ones of [2]. Indeed:
• Some assumptions of [2] (e.g., unstructured random background without cargo influence) are not
always fulfilled in real world situations.
• Some of the arguments were not entirely rigorous, e.g., the ones that estimated theoretically the sen-
sitivity and specificity levels of the detection method under a random variable independence assump-
tion, which was fulfilled only approximately.
• The forward modeling was done in a way that did not allow for complex cargo scenarios nor spatially
varying absorption and scattering cross sections.
• Uncertainty in the direction detection (which is better for γ cameras, but can go up to standard devia-
tion of 12 degrees for neutron Compton type cameras) was not taken into account.
Overcoming these problems is the goal of the current text. Clearly, there is no silver bullet here, which
would assure detection under all possible circumstances. Thus, a thorough study of the efficiency of the
previously developed technique is called for. Due to technical constraints of numerical implementation, we
only address the 2D case here. The implications of this restriction are discussed in Section 7. The 3D case,
as well as other extensions, will be treated in a subsequent publication.
The outline of the article is as follows: Necessary physics preliminaries are provided in Section 2. Section 3
contains the description of the technique employed to solve the radiation transport problem through a cargo
container (forward model). The next Section 4 addresses briefly the inverse problem algorithm of [2]. The
main Section 5 provides the detection results for various cargo container scenarios and their discussions.
Final remarks and conclusions are provided in Section 7. In particular, while in the examples of Section
5 the presence of a source was detected by finding its location, numerical evidence is provided of possible
indications of presence of a source without detecting its actual position.
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2 Physics preliminaries
In this Section, we discuss the physics of gamma radiation pertaining to the application of interest.
The technique devised in [2] is based on the availability of at least a small number of uncollided (“ballistic”)
particles emanating from a small localized source, versus other particles (background particles and source
particles that have scattered). Of particular interest as uncollided particles are the gamma emitted from
characteristic lines of Uranium. By having relatively narrow energy bins around such lines, one can enhance
the signal-to-noise ratio for gamma radiation detected in such energy ranges. However, the four main lines
for Uranium-235 have somewhat low energies (143.8, 166.3, 185.7, and 205.3 keV) and can be attenuated
easily by some amount of shielding material. For instance, particles emitted from the 185-keV line of U-235
(the line with the strongest activity) have an average mean-free-path in high-Z materials of about 0.69 [27],
and thus can be significantly attenuated. On the other hand, Uranium-238 possesses gamma lines at higher
energies (i.e., a line at 1.001 MeV) for which the mean-free-path in high-Z materials is significantly larger
(13.3 mean-free-paths) [27]. Therefore, it will be advantageous to consider, as our signal of interest, the
uncollided gamma rays from the 1.001 MeV line of U-238.
However, other gamma particles may also be present in the energy range of interest. In our application,
background radiation will be stemming from the concrete base located some distance below the container.
Significant gamma lines (above the 1.001 MeV line of U-238) should be taken into consideration as back-
ground radiation impinging the container. These lines include: the 1.461 MeV line from Potassium-40, the
1.12 MeV and 1.76 MeV lines from Bismuth-214, and the 2.61 MeV line from Thallium-208 (Bismuth and
Thallium are daughter products from the decay of Uranium-238 and Thorium-232, respectively, and are
naturally found in concrete).
Assuming a concrete slab thickness of 40 cm and 60 cm gap between the concrete surface and the bottom of
the container, the background radiation emitted from the concrete slab and impinging the lateral and bottom
sides of the container can be easily computed.
Gamma rays due to the HEU source, any legitimate commercial source (if any), and the background radiation
entering the container will undergo scattering and absorption within the volume of the container. Absorption
and scattering within the container will reduce the amount of uncollided HEU source particles reaching the
detectors placed around the container; recall that the signal of interest in our study are the gamma rays from
the 1.001 MeV line of U-238. Scattering will also cause gammas from energies higher than 1.001 MeV to
down-scatter into the energy of interest, adding noise to the signal.
3 Forward radiation transport modeling
The radiation transport within the cargo container is governed by the linear Boltzmann equation, written
below using the multigroup approximation:
~Ω · ~∇Ψg(~r, ~Ω) + Σgt (~r)Ψg(~r, ~Ω) =
G∑
g′=1
L∑
`=0
Σg
′→g
s,` (~r)
m=+`∑
m=−`
Φg
′
`,m(~r) +Q
g(~r, ~Ω) (1)
for all positions ~r ∈ D, all directions ~Ω ∈ S2, and all energy groups g ∈ [1, G], where D is the volume
of the cargo container, S2 the unit sphere, G the total number of energy groups, Ψg the photon angular
flux in energy group g, Σgt the total interaction cross section in group g, Σ
g′→g
s,` the `
th-Legendre moment of
the scattering cross section from group g′ to group g, L is the maximum anisotropy expansion order, and
Qg is the volumetric external source of photons in group g (stemming from the HEU source and any other
volumetric source, if present). The moments of the angular flux are given by
Φg`,m(~r) =
∫
4pi
dΩY`,m(~Ω)Ψ
g(~r, ~Ω) (2)
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Plastic C (33.3%), H(66.7%)
Wood O (25%), C (25%), H (50%)
Cotton O (25%), C (25%), H (50%)
Iron Fe (100%)
HEU Uranium (100%)
Concrete H (0.5%), O (48.7%), Na (1.7%), Mg (2.5%), Al (4.5%), Si (30.8%), K (1.9%),
Ca (8.1%), Fe (1.2%), traces of Th-232 and U-238 and their daughters
Air N (78.1%), O (20.9%), Ar (0.94%), H (0.06%)
Fertilizer K (13.9%), N (46.8%), O (30%), P (9.3%)
Table 1: Material Compositions
where Y`,m is the spherical harmonic of order ` and degree m. Eq. (1) is supplied with boundary conditions:
Ψg(~r, ~Ω) = hg(~r, ~Ω) ∀~r ∈ ∂D− (3)
where ∂D− is the incoming boundary defined as ∂D− = {~r ∈ ∂D such that ~Ω · ~n(~r) < 0} with ~n(~r) the
outward unit normal vector at position ~r. The boundary condition function hg describes the background
radiation impinging on the container due to the presence of a large concrete slab underneath the container.
Photon cross sections for various representative materials have been generated using NJOY-99 [21]. The
materials compositions are given in Table 1. The multigroup structure employed is provided in Table 2.
Energy groups numbered 1, 18, 25, 32, 37 are purposefully narrow to represent accurately background
radiation lines and the U-238 1.001 MeV line.
For demonstration purposes, calculations will be carried out in two-dimensional space. The photon transport
equation, Eq. (1), is discretized using standard techniques:
1. An Sn product Gauss-Legendre-Tchebychev angular quadrature [31] is employed (with a few polar
angles but a very high number of azimuthal angles to resolve properly the angular distribution in the
2D domain).
2. Spatial discretization based on a standard bilinear discontinuous finite element technique with up-
winding at cell interfaces [26, 40].
3. Transport sweeps and Source Iteration are employed to converge the scattering source and determine
the angular photon flux, solution of Eq. (1) [18].
Once the transport equation, Eq. (1), has been iteratively solved, the outgoing angular photon flux at any
boundary edge in 2D is recorded for subsequent utilization in the inverse problem algorithm.
4 Mathematics of the detection technique
We now recap some of the analysis and algorithms of the previous paper [2] (a different, Bayesian approach
was developed in [43]).
4.1 2D with Uniform Random Background
Here we consider a 2D version of the problem. We assume that a small, low emission source of radioactive
material (e.g., HEU) is placed inside of a significantly larger cargo. The ballpark linear size ratio is assumed
to be on the order of 100 - several meters long cargo container vs. several centimeters long source. The
cargo will be depicted in our simulations as a square region surrounded by arrays of detectors. A signifi-
cantly larger, in comparison with the source emission, uniform and isotropic random radiation background
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Group index Lower bound (MeV) Upper bound (MeV)
1 2.61449 2.61451
2 2.56137 2.61449
3 2.50824 2.56137
4 2.45512 2.50824
5 2.402 2.45512
6 2.34887 2.402
7 2.29575 2.34887
8 2.24262 2.29575
9 2.1895 2.24262
10 2.13638 2.1895
11 2.08325 2.13638
12 2.03013 2.08325
13 1.977 2.03013
14 1.92388 1.977
15 1.87076 1.92388
16 1.81763 1.87076
17 1.76451 1.81763
18 1.76449 1.76451
19 1.71391 1.76449
20 1.66333 1.71391
21 1.61275 1.66333
22 1.56217 1.61275
23 1.51159 1.56217
24 1.46101 1.51159
25 1.46099 1.46101
26 1.40421 1.46099
27 1.34743 1.40421
28 1.29065 1.34743
29 1.23387 1.29065
30 1.17709 1.23387
31 1.12031 1.17709
32 1.12029 1.12031
33 1.09047 1.12029
34 1.06065 1.09047
35 1.03083 1.06065
36 1.00101 1.03083
37 1.00099 1.00101
Table 2: Energy group structure
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is present. Our goal is to detect the presence of a source, or to claim its absence. Since we are going to con-
sider situations of extremely low signal-to-noise ratio, it is not expected that detection would be possible,
unless the detectors are, at least to some degree, direction sensitive.
Collimating the detectors, as typically done in medical emission imaging (e.g., SPECT [6,22,23]), provides
the incoming directions of detected particles. However, collimation would most surely decimate the already
low source signal to imperceptible levels. In fact, a similar situation occurs in SPECT, but the signal-to-noise
ratio there is still much larger than in our intended application.
One way to retain the SNR while obtaining some directional information is to use Compton γ-cameras
[2–4, 9, 11, 12, and references therein]. Compton cameras do not use collimation, but correspondingly
provide less specific directional information: a surface cone of possible particle directions is detected, rather
than a specific direction. Analogous detectors (albeit based on somewhat different principles) are currently
being developed for neutron detection [19, 36].
Neutron and γ radiations are the main signals one can rely upon in determining the presence of illicit HEU.
We will use the name “Compton type camera” without making a distinction between the types of particles
considered. The reader can think, for instance, in terms of γ-photons being detected (the assumption adopted
further in this text).
In [2, see also references therein], some “electronic collimation” techniques were developed and tested for
converting Compton data into data that would have come from physically collimated detectors. There is
some limited SNR loss attached to this conversion (see Section 7). We will thus operate in the main body of
this text as if we could collect the true directional information of incoming particles.
The detection technique suggested in [2] is based upon the assumption of existence of at least a small
number of ballistic particles from the source reaching the detector arrays. The scattered source particles
are considered to be a part of the uniform background. Correspondingly, the SNR of interest is defined as
the ratio of the number of detected ballistic source particles to the number of all other detections. We will
be working with signal-to-noise ratios of the order of s = 0.001, or 0.1%, which is in line with numerical
simulations of a shielded HEU source placed in a cargo container.
It was shown in [2] that the standard analytic tomographic techniques fail in this situation. It was argued,
however, that a simple backprojection (see Section 4.2) might create reliably detectable bumps (measured
in standard deviations from the mean) at the source location. A simple probabilistic analysis showed that a
reliable (with 95% confidence) detection can be expected, if the total numberN of detected particles reaches
N ∝
(
8
SNR
)2
p(1− p), (4)
where p is the ratio of the radius of the possible source to the one of the cargo container (p = 0.01 in our
simulations). It was also shown how to estimate specificity, and it was demonstrated that one can achieve
simultaneously high levels of both.
4.2 The Backprojection Method
In this section we briefly describe the backprojection algorithm used in [2]. In that paper, uniform random
background noise and a small low emission point source were simulated. It was assumed that a square
container of interest was surrounded along all four sides by detector arrays which record the location (more
precisely, the detector bin) of collision of each particle as well as its exact incoming direction. A back-
projection image of the container was created by back propagating each particle from the detector into the
numerical domain along its incoming line (which, in general, is different from the original zig zag trajectory
of the particle). A fast rasterization algorithm was used to add a value of 1 to all pixels intersected by the
line. Thus, in the final image, the value at every pixel equaled the number of lines intersecting it. Note that
if a source is present, all backprojected ballistic source particles pass through the source location.
After backprojection was completed, the image was tested for unusual peaks, that is, pixels with values
several standard deviations above the mean. Since high deviations are very unlikely to appear in a uniform
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random background, their presence signals a possible source. Confidence values were assigned to detected
sources following a probabilistic analysis similar to that in Section 4.4. However, it was assumed in [2]
that exact incoming directions of particles could be measured, while in the current work we use a more
realistic detector model which takes into account angular errors. In [2], based on the assumption of absence
of angular errors, it was shown that high confidence of detection and high sensitivity are to be expected
when the total number of detected particles satisfies relation (4).
It is worth mentioning that in the same paper a more delicate situation was also considered, where only a
“gate” of three arrays was present. The issue in this case was that backprojected data was non-uniform
anymore, due to many particles being undetected. In this case, the mean and standard deviation were
computed locally in a neighborhood of each pixel. A similar situation will also arise in the current work,
the background being non-uniform not only due to missing detectors but also as a consequence of external
radiation sources (e.g. concrete flooring) and different materials filling the cargo.
4.3 Using Compton type cameras
As it has already been mentioned, several methods were developed in [2] to convert Compton type data to
one that would come from truly collimated detectors. Such transforms have been considered in the litera-
ture before (e.g. [3, 4, 9, 20, 24, 35]). The caveat here is that Compton data is significantly over-determined,
since the space of cones with apex at a detector is three-dimensional in 2D and five-dimensional in 3D.
The solution adopted in most works addressing Compton camera imaging was to restrict the data to a two-
dimensional set in 2D and a three-dimensional one in 3D. However, this approach is unfeasible in the detec-
tion problem discussed here, since restriction would essentially eliminate all useful signal. Thus, methods
involving all Compton data had to be developed and numerical implementation needed to be done in a way
that avoided the speed and memory problems arising due to multi-dimensionality. The main conversion
method considered in [2] was equivalent to backprojection of each particle along its cone of possible in-
coming directions. Thus, the values at every pixel in the backprojected image equaled the number of cones1
intersecting it.
In this text we restrict ourselves to using the directional data that would have been obtained by converting
from Compton camera measurements.
4.4 Incorporation of angular errors
Here we introduce a modification to the treatment of [2] that incorporates possible errors in detection of
directions of incoming particles.
Consider a circular domain of interest of radius R surrounded by detector arrays. Suppose the detectors
are collimated physically or electronically, so that directional information of all detected particles can be
determined. We assume that the angular information recorded by the detectors has a Gaussian error with
standard deviation α degrees. Let us partition the source region into square pixels of dimension r by r and
define p = r/R. Then the area contains approximately M = pi/p2 pixels. We also denote the total number
of detected particles by N . Suppose n lines (backprojected particle trajectories) intersect a given pixel B
and write n = ns + nb where ns is the number of ballistic particles from the source and nb is the number of
background particles. Under the conditions of our scenarios, one can apply the Central Limit Theorem and
consider the number n of lines intersecting a pixel being normally distributed with the mean µ = pN and
standard deviation σ =
√
Np(1− p).
Let us now choose a threshold value kt such that the probability of a normal variable to reach more than kt
standard deviations above the mean in at least one out of M ∼ 104 independent realizations2 is very small.
We use in our experiments the number kt = 4.3. Note that a useful kt will change depending on the size of
the pixels relative to the size of the whole domain, or equivalently, on the value of p. (We will revisit this
1Note that in the two dimensional setting, a cone simply consists of two lines intersecting at a point on the detector array.
2104 corresponds to the number of pixels.
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shortly.) We make the claim that a source has been detected if an abnormally high number n of lines pass
through a pixel B, that is, if n > nt := µ+ ktσ.
The probability of at least nt lines crossingB due to random reasons is approximately rt := 0.5 erfc(kt/
√
2).
Taking into account the number of pixels M , the probability of at least nt lines crossing at least one of the
pixels due to random reasons (a “false positive”) can be approximated by
fp rate = 1− (1− rt)M . (5)
The true negative rate is then given by tn rate = 1− fp rate or
κ := tn rate = confidence := (1− rt)M =
[
1− 0.5 erfc
(
kt/
√
2
)]M
. (6)
Now coming back to the value of kt, suppose we want to have a minimum confidence level κ ∈ (0, 1). Then
kt must satisfy
kt >
√
2 erfc−1
[
2
(
1− κ1/M
)]
. (7)
For example, if we need a true negative rate of at least 99% and we have M = 104 pixels, then we need to
choose kt > 4.753. If we are satisfied with a true negative rate of only 90% and have just M = 103 pixels,
then kt > 3.706 will suffice. Recall that M is dependent on p, so we can instead write in the inequality for
kt as
kt >
√
2 erfc−1
[
2
(
1− κp2/pi
)]
.
Notice that this consideration is still valid when errors in direction determination are present
Now consider the probability of missing a source that is present. Here errors might play significant role.
Assume that we have an a priori ballpark estimate for ns. In σ units, ns = ksσ where ks is a positive
constant and σ is the standard deviation of the distribution of the number of background trajectories passing
through a pixel. However, since our detector has errors in its measurements, not all of the detected source
particles detected are back projected through the pixel containing the source. Let α be the standard deviation
of the error of the angular measurement. Then if a particle is emitted from a source inside a pixel B and is
detected on the circular array, the probability that it will be back projected through Br is related to the size
of the pixel r, the distance from the boundary d, and the standard deviation of the angular error α. Since the
location of the source is not known a priori, we do not know what d is. Consider the worst case example
where d = R (if the source is close to the boundary, detection is easier). Then the detected particle is back
projected through B if and only if θ < arctan(r/R) = arctan p. Let C(p, α) be defined as
C(p, α) :=
1
2
erf
(
arctan p√
2α
)
.
This number is the probability that given the normal distribution N(0, α) of angular errors, the back projec-
tion of a particle passes through the pixel B (that is, if θ < arctan p). Then, due to the error, only about
n′s = C(p, α)ns = k′sσ background particles may be projected through pixel Br. Our test detects a source
at B if n = n′s + nb > µ+ ktσ, so it will miss it if nb < µ− (k′s − kt)σ. The probability of this happening
(the false negative rate) is
fn rate = 0.5 erfc
(
k′s − kt√
2
)
. (8)
For example, if k′s − kt ≥ 3, then the probability of missing the source is at most 0.135%.
The true positive rate (given by tp rate = 1−fn rate) is what we call the sensitivity. If we require a particular
sensitivity ζ, then in order to detect a source with this sensitivity we need
k′s − kt ≥
√
2 erfc−1[2(1− ζ)]. (9)
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Recalling the requirement for kt given a confidence κ, this means
k′s > K(κ, ζ,M) :=
√
2 erfc−1
[
2
(
1− κ1/M
)]
+
√
2 erfc−1[2(1− ζ)]. (10)
To detect a source with sensitivity ζ, we need n′s > K(κ, ζ,M)σ. We claim that for any SNR s > 0 and
kt > 0 it is possible to detect the source, provided that the total number of detected particlesN is sufficiently
large.
Given a signal to noise ratio s and if p 1, the number of detected source particles back projected near the
source is n′s ≈ C(p, α)sN and σ ≈
√
Np(1− p). So we require
C(p, α)sN > K(κ, ζ,M)
√
Np(1− p). (11)
Since the left hand side grows linearly withN and the right hand side grows only as
√
N , the inequality will
hold for sufficiently large N .
We can expect to reliably detect the source with given sensitivity and specificity, if the total particle count
N at the detectors is on the order of
N ∝
(
K(κ, ζ,M)
C(p, α)s
)2
p(1− p) (12)
or higher. Or, writing this without using coefficients K(κ, ζ,M) and C(p, α),
N ∝ 8
erfc−1
(
2
(
1− κ1/M))+ erfc−1(2(1− ζ))
erf
(
arctan p√
2α
)
s
2 p(1− p). (13)
4.5 3D case
Similar approach and algorithms were also developed for the fully 3D Compton data [1]. This part still
requires additional work, both on forward and inverse computations, and is thus postponed until the next
publication.
The relation of the 2D model to the true 3D situation is discussed in Section 7.
5 Case studies
In this section, we study the performance of the algorithm for various cargo/background/detector configura-
tions and various SNR levels.
In all subsections below, it is assumed that a small (with p = 0.01) source is placed into a larger cargo. The
cargo configurations vary from case to case. We start with the simplest situation of spatially and angularly
isotropic random background3 and then proceed to more difficult scenarios.
As it was explained in [2], even for very small values of SNR, increasing observation time (and thus the num-
ber of detected particles), one could eventually reach the detection level. The question is, though, whether
this observation time is practical (observing a car at a border crossing for a week is clearly unreasonable).
Thus, in all cargo scenarios (except the next section with uniformly random background), we show the ob-
servation time instead of the number of detected particles. Doing so, we use the real parameters of cargo
materials and HEU source (see section 2).
3This often a non-realistic assumption, except probably for containers filled with fertilizer.
8
5.1 Uniform random background
We start with the simplest situation considered in [2]. Namely, we assume that the background radiation
is uniform and isotropic in the space of all possible rays intersecting the cargo container. We thus ran 20
(sometimes 100) random realizations of the radiation for each box, labeled by the pair of values of N and
SNR. Four arrays of 48 detectors, each with 180 angular bins, were used in each case. The background
corresponded to the concrete base, as described in Section 2.
In the tables in the top rows of Fig. 1 20 realizations for each box were used. If a box contains a number,
say 18, it indicates in how many out of 20 simulations the source was detected. Detection was considered
to be confirmed, if the confidence probability was at least 95% that the location’s high concentration cannot
be explained by random fluctuations of the background.
The color scheme was used that indicated completely successful detection in green (dark grey) in the upper
right corner and then changed to the red (black) part of the spectrum in the lower left with decreasing
detectability.
The theoretical relations (4) and (13) provide curves in the N -SNR parameter plane that are supposed to
roughly separate detectability and non-detectability regions. The blue straight lines (the logarithmic scale
was used) were drawn that correspond to these theoretical boundaries of the detectability regions.
The variable along the vertical axis in all tables was the SNR value s in percents, varying from 0.01%
to 100%. The horizontal axis indicates the number of detected ballistic source particles (so 1000 ballistic
source particles with SNR = 1% mean that the total number of detected particles was 105).
Additional parameter of interest (especially important for neutron Compton type detectors, where good
angular precision is hard and costly to obtain), is the error of the detection of directions. We assumed that
the error in the recorded directions is normally distributed centered at zero with a standard deviation of α
degrees. The tables from the left to right in Fig. 1 show the results for α = 0 and 2 degrees correspondingly.
In presence of angular errors, instead of formula (4), its analog (13) is used.
The bottom row of tables shows, rather the number of successful detection, the average over the 20 runs of
the hight above the mean of the peak in the reconstruction at the detection location, measured in standard
deviations.
Some boxes do not have numbers in them, which indicates that no test runs were done for those values.
However, all such boxes are either above (better) than others with perfect detection or lower (worse) than
those with bad detection. Thus the colors (shades) were just extrapolated there.
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Figure 1: Vertical axis - SNR in %. Horizontal axis - the number of detected ballistic particles from the
source. Both axes are in logarithmic scale. From left to right the angular standard error is α = 0 and 2
degrees. Top row, in each box - numbers of successful detections out of 20 random realizations. Bottom
row, in each box - numbers of standard deviations above the mean at the detected source. Blue line - the
theoretical estimate (4) and (13) of the detectability region.
The tables in Fig. 2 are similar, except that the angular error was α = 5 (left column) and α = 12 (right
column) degrees correspondingly. Also, in the right column, 100, rather than 20, random realizations for
each box were used.
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Figure 2: Vertical axis - SNR in %. Horizontal axis - the number of detected ballistic particles from the
source. Both axes are in logarithmic scale. From left to right the angular standard error is α = 5 and 12
degrees. Top row, in each box - numbers of successful detections out of 20 (left column) and 100 (right
column) random realizations. Bottom row, in each box - numbers of standard deviations above the mean at
the detected source. Blue line - the theoretical estimate (13) of the detectability region.
The tables show that the theoretically predicted in [2] detectability results do hold in numerical experiments.
The theoretical lines, in spite of simplifying assumptions used, amazingly well indicate the detectability
regions of parameters. We also notice that they do reach the desired SNR level, if the observation time (and
thus the number of particles detected) increases. The angular errors certainly lead to deterioration of the
detection (still corresponding well to the theoretical lines of Section 7). The deviation of around 5σ leads to
11
detection, also in accordance with analysis done in [2].
5.2 Cargo Scenarios
In the scenarios below, it is assumed that an HEU source (shown as  in figures) is of size 5cm × 5cm,
while each out of eight rectangular material blocks is 60cm × 120cm, forming the cargo hold of the size
2.4 × 2.4meter2. The materials in each box are shown in figures as follows: plastic (striped texture),
cotton (plaid texture), wood (wood grain texture), concrete (concrete texture), iron (metal tread texture).
The background is assumed to come from the concrete base below the cargo as described in Section 2, while
the background radiation is shielded from the other three sides.
Four arrays (in some simulations three, when indicated, with the bottom one missing) of equally spaced 48
detectors, each with 180 angular bins were used in each simulation. Both reconstructions with the complete
direction sensitive “detectors,” as well as with “Compton detectors” were used, as indicated in captions.
The forward data were simulated according to physical parameters described in Section 2 and numerical
techniques indicated in Section 3.
The reconstructed images were thresholded at the level of 4.3σ above the (local) mean and results are shown
both as density and surface plots.
5.2.1 Cargo Scenario #1
Here the cargo contains plastic, cotton, wood, and an HEU source (), as shown in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Scenario #1 Material Arrangement: plastic (striped texture), cotton (plaid texture), wood (wood
grain texture), and an HEU source ().
Figure 4 shows the density and surface plots of backprojection with the cut off at 4.3σ. The exposure time
is 2 seconds. 124 particles at 1 MeV were detected, 119 of which are ballistic, which gives a signal to noise
ratio of 23.8.
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Figure 4: Scenario #1 with 4 detector arrays. Exposure Time = 2 seconds. Density and surface plots of
backprojection with the cut off at 4.3σ. The source is clearly found.
In the next figure we show the same results obtained by using Compton data and converting them to the
synthetically collimated ones.
Figure 5: Scenario #1 with 4 Compton detector arrays. Exposure Time = 2 seconds
In Figure 6, we use three detector arrays.The bottom array (closest to the source) is missing.
Figure 6: Scenario #1 with 3 detector arrays (the bottom one missing). Exposure Time = 10 seconds
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Due to the absence of the detector array closest to the source, many ballistic particles from the source are
not accounted for, which results in a longer observation time for detection.
Fig. 7 shows the similar set-up, but with three Compton detector arrays.
Figure 7: Scenario #1 with 3 Compton detector arrays (the bottom one missing. Exposure Time = 10 seconds
Fig. 8 shows the effect of dropping SNR to 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001 respectively, on the reconstruction
Figure 8: Scenario #1 with 4 detector arrays at SNR equal to 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001.
And now, the similar situation with three detectors at SNR of 0.1 and 0.01:
14
Figure 9: Scenario #1 with 3 detectors at various SNR
Since, the most valuable detector array is missing, one observes clear deterioration.
One can see some corner artifacts, which arise due to the square geometry of the observation (detector)
surface. See also Section 7 for this discussion.
5.2.2 Cargo Scenario #2
Here we try to make the detection harder, so the Cargo Scenario #2 contains plastic, cotton, wood texture,
iron at 50% density, and an HEU source () inside the iron box, as shown in Figure 10. The HEU source is
5cm× 5cm and each rectangular material block is 60cm× 120cm.
Figure 10: Scenario #2 Material Arrangement: plastic (striped texture), cotton (plaid texture), wood (wood
grain texture), iron (metal tread texture) at 50% density, and an HEU source ().
The particle count is clearly lower here, so longer observation time is required.
In Fig. 11 below, the same as before set-up of four detector arrays is used. Figure shows the detection with
the same cut off at 4.3σ as before and 5 min observation.
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Figure 11: Scenario #2 with 4 detector arrays. Exposure Time = 5 minutes
And now the same using Compton data:
Figure 12: Scenario #2 with 4 Compton detector arrays. Exposure Time = 5 minutes
In the next Fig. 13, three detector arrays are used (with the most relevant bottom one missing). Here a much
longer observation time of 7 days is required to reach the same level of detection.
Figure 13: Scenario #2 with 3 detector arrays: Exposure Time = 7 days
About the same situation is with the Compton data, Fig. 14:
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Figure 14: Scenario #2 with 3 Compton detector arrays. Exposure Time = 7 days
Here is the detection as a function of SNR= 0.1, 0.01, 0.001:
Figure 15: Scenario #2 with 4 detector arrays at various levels of SNR: 0.1, 0.01, 0.001.
And finally, the same with three detector arrays at SNR of 0.1 and 0.01:
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Figure 16: Scenario #2 with 3 detector arrays at SNR=0.1, 0.01.
5.2.3 Cargo Scenario #3
The next Cargo Scenario #3 contains plastic, cotton, wood, concrete, and an HEU source as shown in Figure
17. The sizes of the boxes and source are the same as before.
Figure 17: Scenario #3 Material Arrangement: plastic (striped texture), cotton (plaid texture), wood (wood
grain texture), concrete (concrete texture), and an HEU source (.
It is clear that the source is shielded much better now, especially if the bottom detector array is missing.
The detection with four and three detector arrays are shown in the next two figures:
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Figure 18: Scenario #3 with 4 detector arrays. Exposure Time = 1 minute
As expected, in this scenario it takes a significantly longer time to detect with three detector arrays:
Figure 19: Scenario #3 with 3 detectors: Exposure Time = 24 hours
As we did before, we show in the next two figures the SNR sensitivity of the detection for four and three
detector arrays:
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Figure 20: Scenario #3 with 4 detector arrays at SNR levels 0.1, 0.01, 0.001.
Figure 21: Scenario #3 with 3 detector arrays at SNR levels 0.1, 0.01
We now modify the scenario by moving deeper the location of the source.
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5.2.4 A modified Cargo Scenario #3 (Source Moved)
Figure 22: Modified Scenario #3. Material Arrangement
One discovers much better detection here:
Figure 23: Modified Scenario #3 with 4 detector arrays. Exposure Time = 1 second
Figure 24: Modified Scenario #3 with 3 detector arrays (the bottom one missing). Exposure Time = 1 second
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One notices no deterioration due to the missing bottom detector array, since for the current location of the
source the bottom array does not play such a major role anymore. The sensitivity for low SNR also improves:
Figure 25: Modified Scenario #3 with 3 detectors at SNR=0.1, 0.01.
5.2.5 Cargo Scenario #4
The Cargo Scenario #4 contains plastic, cotton, wood, iron at 50% density, concrete, and an HEU source as
shown in Figure 26.
Figure 26: Scenario #4. Material Arrangement: plastic (striped texture), cotton (plaid texture), wood (wood
grain texture), iron at 50% density (metal tread texture), concrete (concrete texture), and an HEU source
().
This scenario is significantly more difficult, due to the thick iron and concrete shielding. Nevertheless, with
complete enclosure by detector arrays detection is possible in a reasonable amount of time:
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Figure 27: Scenario #4 with 4 detector arrays. Exposure Time = 2 minutes
However, using three detector arrays, with the bottom one missing, reliable detection becomes impossible
even for long observation times. The SNR dependence is shown below:
Figure 28: Scenario #4 with 4 detector arrays at SNR = 0.1, 0.01, 0.001.
5.2.6 Cargo Scenario #5 (Fertilizer)
In Cargo Scenario #5, the container is filled with self-radiating fertilizer (see its description in Section 2)
and contains an HEU source. The situation is very much like the uniform random background case of [2]
(see also Section 4). One thus expects firm detection, which indeed happens to be the case, and detection
probabilities computed in [2] being applicable. Figure 29 shows the back projection with cut off at 4.3σ for
an exposure time of 60 seconds. The confidence based on the threshold value of 4.3σ is 94.68, however the
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detection confidence based on the computed value of 6.2σ is 99.9998%.
Figure 29: Scenario #5 with 4 detector arrays. Exposure Time = 60 seconds
Elimination of the bottom detector does not spoil things much and gives detection with the confidence of
99.98%.
Figure 30: Scenario #5 with 3 detector arrays. Exposure Time = 2 minutes
6 Empty spaces scenarios
In this section, we make an interesting numerical observation, which needs to be studied further analytically
and numerically. Namely, numerical evidence that we provide below indicates that, unlike in previous
scenarios, where detection of the presence of a source coincides with finding its exact location, there are
situations when one might have a strong evidence of presence of the source, without detecting its location.
This seems to depend on existence of narrow unfilled spaces that usually exist even in well loaded containers.
6.1 Single Energy Group
For the following figures, in the forward calculation all radiation (source and background) was considered
to be in one large energy group. No energy changes are taken into account and all detected particles are used
for the detection.
This scenario consists of an HEU source in the middle. The gray blocks are iron. The rest is void. The
background radiation comes from all sides isotropically.
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Figure 31: Material Arrangement
In this scenario, there is no direct (straight line) path between the source and the detector arrays that does not
pass through the iron blocks, which practically eliminated the chance to rely upon ballistic particles coming
from the source4. However, as the simulations below show, one can still reasonably infer the presence of an
internal radiation source from differences between the images obtained.
The Figure 32 shows the results of reconstruction procedure. The left column shows the backprojected
image, while the right column shows the deviation from the (local) mean, measured in standard deviations.
The top row shows the results without the source being present, i.e. just with the background and thus
SNR= 0. The middle row shows the presence of a very weak source (SNR=0.0001). Finally, the lowest row
corresponds to our target SNR 0.001. Here the SNR is the ratio of the number all particles (not just ballistic)
emitted by the source to the number of the background ones. The exposure time is long.
4Even tighter shielding has been tried with similar results.
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Figure 32: Grid with 4 detectors at various SNR= 0, 0.0001, 0.001
One notices that in presence of the source one gets much clearer picture of the passages between the cargo
boxes. It is not only clearer geometrically, but also stronger numerically. Indeed, the color scales are
different between the top and bottom rows. Otherwise the passages would not be seen well in the top row.
So, the difference between the low and high intensities is about 6 times higher in the bottom picture than in
the top one (with an intermediate situation in the middle row).
One can ask whether the similar effect occurs for a reasonably short observation times. The Figure 33.
Shows that it does. The exposure time is 30 seconds. The top row has only background, while the bottom
one has a weak source with SNR= 0.0006. Here there is a much greater difference between the low and
high points, which means the internal structure becomes visible at much more reasonable exposure times.
(The figure below demonstrates this difference.)
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Figure 33: Left Column: Back Projection, Right Column: local mean subtracted, SNR= 0, 0.0006. The
results for a 30 second exposure time with just the background (top row) and with the HEU source (bottom
row). Detected particle counts: 145,391 for background only and 210,178 for background plus HEU source
(with just 134 ballistic)
Multiple Energy Groups
For this scenario (as with all the cargo container scenarios),the forward modeling was done using multiple
energy groups as described in the forward modeling section. The background radiation is due to concrete
and, in this case, is coming from all sides isotropically. All energy groups were modeled in the forward
calculation, with energy changes allowed. For the back projection, only energy group 37 is used, that is,
we only deal with the subset of data from the 1 MeV range for the inverse problem. Due to the energy
changes, this group is polluted by additional noise. The Figure 34 shows that this time we cannot see the
internal passages without an HEU source (top row). This is due to the fact that concrete does not radiate
in the energy group we are back projecting. Thus any radiation due to background detected in that energy
group must have been scattered. As we increase the strength of the source (second row: SNR = 0.001, third
row: SNR = 0.003, bottom row: SNR = 0.01), the empty corridors in the container become more and more
apparent.
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Figure 34: Results at SNR= 0, 0.001, 0.003, 0.01. Left Column: Back Projection. Right Column: Local
Mean subtracted
One more example below shows a stronger iron shielding of the source (Fig. 35) and long reconstruction
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time (Fig. 36).
Figure 35: Material Arrangement
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Figure 36: Results at SNR= 0, 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01. Left Column: Back Projection. Right Column: Local
Mean subtracted
Again, we see that even though the actual location of the internal source is not detected, we can reasonably
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deduce that there is one. Clearly, additional analytic and probabilistic considerations are needed to make
these results more quantitative and reliable. This is planned for another publication.
7 Final remarks and conclusions
The results of this study show that the method developed in [2] works well for detecting the presence of small
amounts of special nuclear materials placed in large containers/trucks filled with various realistic types of
cargo. Not only sensitivity, but also specificity of the method, as it was shown in [2] and in this text, can be
very high even in cases of an extremely low SNR, in the ballpark of 0.001.
The suggested technique is highly parallelizable and can be run simultaneously with the measurements being
collected.
There are, however, various issues still to be addressed in the future work. Among those, one can mention
the following:
1. The technique has been implemented to the full extent in the 2D situation only. Although some trial
runs have been done in 3D, the full implementation of numerics (for both forward modeling and
detection) still needs to be done.
One can ask whether the 2D implementation has any relation to the real world situation at all then,
besides running the technique in numerically simpler situation. For instance, one wonders whether
one could try to image a 2D slice of the container. It is possible in principle, but it would clearly
reduce significantly the already small SNR, since the emission from the source is highly unlikely to
honor the plane of the slice we choose for observation. This should render detectability to be much
worse. Some modeling of this has been done, which confirms this conclusion.
On the other hand, the 2D model we studied corresponds to the cylindrical 3D geometry of the cargo
and detectors. Although this is also not a too realistic situation, it still can be considered as a useful
trial run before the full 3D technique is implemented.
2. The very intriguing and potentially important numerical observation made in the final section of the
paper is that the presence of a source whose shielding does not allow for any significant number
of ballistic particles getting to the detectors could still be implied by highlighted cargo passages.
Although background radiation also can lead to this effect, our observation is that the strength of this
highlighting is much stronger in the presence of a source. This observation needs to be made more
precise by its analytic study, which we also intend to produce.
3. The reader should have noticed that some corner artifacts arise in many of our reconstructions. In some
cases they are strong enough to compete with the detected source. Our preliminary study shows that
this is just the effect of the square detector geometry that we choose. If a ring (sphere) of detectors
is used, these artifacts are not present. One can deal with them easily in the square geometry as
well, just by excluding the corners from the reconstruction domain. This comment will be expanded
analytically and numerically in a future publications.
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